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COURTS: IN AND OUT OF SIGHT, SITE, AND CITE
The Norman Shachoy Lecture
JUDITH RESNIKt
I. SETTING THE SCENE (OR ITS ABSENCE): THE VANISHING TRILuO N several occasions during the fall of 2007, groups gathered to ad-
dress "'judicial transparency"-the question that animates this sym-
posium. In addition to conferences convened by RAND's Institute for
Civil Justice and UCLA Law School in Los AngelesI by Villanova Univer-
sity outside of Philadelphia, and at Birkbeck College of the University of
London, 2 federal legislators turned their attention to what proponents
called "sunshine." Two bills-one aimed at expanding judicial authority
and the other at constraining it-were introduced in Congress. One pro-
posal (the "Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2007") would authorize fed-
eral appellate and trial judges to permit the photographing and the
t Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. © All rights reserved.
This article was first presented as the Norman J. Shachoy Lecture, the keynote
address at the Villanova University School of Law Symposium: The Future of
Judicial Transparency, held at Villanova Law School on February 2, 2008. My
thanks to the participants from whom I learned a great deal, to the convenors
Steven L. Chanenson, Michael W. Carroll, and Penelope Pether; to Yale law
librarians Camilla Tubbs and Michael Widener for their insightful guidance and
advice; to Linda Mulcahy, Piyel Haldar, Marc Galanter, Nancy Marder and the
other participants at the workshop at Birkbeck College; to Kim Scheppelle, Olivier
Dutheillet; to Allison Tait, Stella Burch, Chavi Kenney Nana, Vasudha Talla, Laurie
Ball, Joseph Frueh, Kate Desormeau, Natalie Ram, Julia Schiesel, Phu Nguyen,
Dane Lund, Naima Farrell, Laura Heiman, and Hannah Hubler whose research
has been so thoughtful and thorough, and to Susan Monsen, Cassie Klatka and
Lucinda Currell for technical assistance.
This Lecture overlaps with-and builds on-a book underway as well as on
essays written with Dennis E. Curtis, whose thoughts infuse this commentary. See
Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, From 'Rites' to 'Rights' of Audience: The Utilities and
Contingencies of the Public's Role in Court-Based Processes, in REPRESENTATIONS OF
JUSTICE (Antoine Masson & Kevin O'Connor eds., 2007); Judith Resnik & Dennis
E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-First-Century
Courthouses, 151 PROC. Am. PHIL. Soc'Y 139 (2007) [hereinafter Resnik & Curtis,
Representing Justice]; see alsoJudith Resnik, The Marx Lecture, The Places of Power of
the State: From Renaissance Town Halls to Guantdnamo Bay, 77 U. CIN. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2009); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L.
REv. 1101 (2006); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the
Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REx'. 521
(2006).
1. RAND & UCLA Sch. of Law Conference, Transparency in the Civil Justice
System (2007); those papers will be part of a forthcoming book. See RAND, Events,
Transparency in the Civil Justice System, http://www.rand.org/events/2007/11/
02 (last visited June 28, 2008). See also Henry Weinstein, Prying into Judicial Secrecy,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at B3.
2. Birkbeck College, Univ. of London Symposium, Adjudicatory Practices in
Transition: Courts and the Public Sphere (Dec. 11, 2007).
(771)
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televising of proceedings under certain circumstances.3 Another initiative
(the "Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2007") would limit the power of federal
judges to permit parties to seal settlements or to promise confidentiality of
discovery materials in civil cases.
4
Why has the topic of judicial transparency garnered this attention?
The high visibility end of the litigation docket provides one reason. In the
wake of 9/11, both civil and criminal cases have raised issues about access
to information, government surveillance, and open decision-making. Cit-
ing national security, the United States government has repeatedly argued
that it should not have to reveal information to federal judges charged
with reviewing the lawfulness of classifications of individuals as "enemy
combatants."'5 The federal government has also sought and succeeded in
obtaining dismissals-on the basis of "state's secrets"-of cases claiming
that persons under its charge have been sent to countries where they have
been tortured or abused.
6
3. See Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2007, H.R. 2128, 110th Cong.
(2007); Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2008, S. 352, 110th Cong. (2008). The
House bill, co-sponsored by Representatives Chabot and Delahunt, provides fed-
eral appellate and district court judges the discretion to "permit the photograph-
ing, electronic recording, broadcasting, or televising to the public of any court
proceeding over which that judge presides," unless this would violate the "due pro-
cess rights of any party." See H.R. 2128 §2(b) (1) (B); §2(b)(2)(A)(iii). For fed-
eral trials, jurors may not be televised, and witnesses may request that their faces
and voices be disguised so that they are unrecognizable to the broadcast audience.
See H.R. 2128 § 2(b) (2) (A) (ii); § 2(b) (2) (B). The text of the Senate bill, cospon-
sored by Senators Grassley, Schumer, Leahy, Specter, Graham, Feingold, Cornyn,
Durbin, Craig and Allard, is identical. See S. 352.
4. See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2007, S. 2449, 110th Cong. (2007). I sub-
mitted testimony for the record in that hearing. See The Sunshine in Litigation Act:
Does Court Secrecy Undermine Public Health and Safety: Hearing on S. 2449 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 181-205 (2007) (statement of Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman
Professor of Law, Yale Law School). This bill is sponsored by Senator Herbert
Kohl of Wisconsin who had proposed related bills in earlier sessions. See, e.g., Sun-
shine in Litigation Act of 2005, S. 1348, 109th Cong. (2005); Cameras in the Court-
room: Hearing on S. 829 and S. 1768 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
331 (2005).
5. See, e.g., Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 13940 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Gates v. Bismullah, 128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008). The D.C. Circuit
decision held that in order for the court to discharge its function under the De-
tainee Treatment Act, the government had to provide the court with the "reasona-
bly available information in the possession of the U.S. Government bearing on the
issue of whether the detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy
combatant ...." The government then sought expedited review in the United
States Supreme Court on the grounds that complying with the lower court's order
would constitute an enormous burden-by requiring that a "record" be created
for each detainee-and seriously jeopardize national security because such a re-
cord would likely include highly sensitive classified material. See Motion for Expe-
dited Consideration of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Gates v. Bismullah,
128 S. Ct. 2960 (2008) (No. 07-1054).
6. See, e.g., EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 373 (2007). These issues are in play worldwide. See, e.g., Privilege for the
State, 5731-1971, 2 LSI 198 (1968-72) (Isr.); Law No. 98-567 ofJuly 8, 1998,Journal
[Vol. 53: p. 771
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Another reason why many people are focusing on the public nature
of court procedures is the growing awareness of a more general phenome-
non-the privatization of court-based processes across the docket that be-
comes apparent through an assessment of trends in aggregate data over
time. This point is illustrated by a chart, Civil and Criminal Trial Rates,
United States Federal Courts (1976-2000) (fig.1), that maps the rate of trials
between 1976 and 2000 in the federal courts of the United States. 7 Both
civil and criminal cases show a downward slope. While minor variations
exist, other data demonstrate that in every kind of case the trend line is
the same: even as filings have increased, the percentages of cases going to
Civil and Criminal Trial Rates,
United States Federal Courts, 1976-2000
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Figure 1.
Officiel de la Rfpublique Franaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 9,
1998, p.10488; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
1 BvR 385/90 (1999) (F.R.G.); see also Botmeh & Alami v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 15187/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 7, 2007); Ami Kobo, Privileged Evidence and State
Security Under the Israeli Law: Are We Doomed To Fail, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICSJ. 113 (2007). Descriptions of the handling of materials related to national
security are provided by ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TERRORISM-
RELATED CASES: SPECIAL CASE-MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES (2008) and in Robert
Timothy Reagan, Classified Information in Federal Court, 53 VILL. L. REv. 889 (2008).
7. This figure is provided by and reproduced with the permission of the Hon-
orable Patrick Higginbotham. Judge Higginbotham has served as the Chair of the
United States Judicial Conference Committee that reviews the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and has written many articles about the federal system. He too has
voiced his concern about the trend away from trials. See Patrick E. Higginbotham,
Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why
Do We Call Them Trial Courts, 55 SMU L. REv. 1405, 1423 (2002).
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trial (and the absolute numbers of trials) have declined. 8 Information
from the states shows a comparable pattern of declining numbers of tri-
als. 9 The image portrayed in this first chart has become known in the
legal community over the last few years as part of what Marc Galanter has
named "the Vanishing Trial."10 As his data show, the decline in trials has
continued. Of one hundred civil cases filed, trials start in fewer than
two.l 
I open my discussion with this chart to outline the three purposes of
this Shachoy Lecture. First, although this symposium is dedicated to the
question of the "future of transparency," understanding the history of why
transparency is associated with courts is essential. Today's rights of public
access to courts developed out of Renaissance traditions that put aspects of
adjudication before the public eye. Below, I trace the shift from what were
once rituals and spectacles of public power to democratic rights of access
to open and public courts.
Second, I explain how, during the last few decades, these public
processes are being replaced through three principal techniques: recon-
figuring the processes within courts, outsourcing some of the activity of
courts, and precluding access to courts. As a consequence, much of what
was or could have been public becomes private.
But to show change is not necessarily to object to it. The questions
raised by the chart mapping the decline in rates of cases going to trial are
whether the fact of the "vanishing trial" is a problem and, if so, why. Given
that procedural processes are regularly reconfigured, what-aside from
tradition-is at stake as trials "vanish"? My third purpose is to provide an
answer by outlining a theory of why democracies ought to care about pub-
lic adjudicatory processes and, therefore, to devise new methods to pre-
serve the public dimensions of dispute resolution.
8. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRJCAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
9. See id. at 506-13; see also Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna M. Strickland & Paula L.
Hannaford-Agor, Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 755 (2004).
10. In 1962, 5802 civil trials took place; forty years later in 2002, with many
more cases filed, 4569 civil trials were held around the United States. In percent-
age terms, the decline was from 11.5% to 2% in civil trials commenced during that
time period. See Galanter, supra note 8, at 459-60.
11. See id.; see also Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A Problem in Need of
Solution?, 79 CONN. B.J. 1, 4-5 (2005); Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer
Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al. In 2006, 259,541 civil
cases were filed in the federal courts, and 88,216 indictments were lodged against
criminal defendants. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Judicial Business
of the United States Courts 156 tbl. C, 214 tbl. D (2006), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf [hereinafter 2006 Ju-
dicial Business]. In contrast, 12,612 civil trials, and 7,491 criminal trials took place.
See 2006 Judicial Business, supra, at 198 tbl. C-7.
[Vol. 53: p. 771
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II. PRE-DEMOCRATIC ADJUDICATION
Where did the practices of public adjudication come from? Below I
quickly sketch-in part by showing pictures-several hundred years of his-
tory as I describe the didactic purposes of public courts. The next image
(fig.2) helps to provide part of the answer. Reproduced is an engraved
Figure 2. Engraved Title
Page, Dutch Law and
Practice in Civil and Crimi-
nal Matters (Practycke der
nederlansche rechten van de
Sdaghelijcksche soo civile als
_ , - , ,,, criminele questien) Author:
Bernhard van Zutphen,
title page from a book published in 1655 by Bernhard van Zutphen; its
English title is Dutch Law and Practice in Civil and Criminal Matters.1 2 Some
spectators in the foreground talk with each other, while others are focused
on the court proceedings. This same scene with minor variation can be
found in several other volumes of that era.1 3 The densely populated
12. Zutphen was a prominent legal scholar who was well-known for his work
on criminal law. SeeJames Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the
Making of Commerce: Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1867-71 (1995). My
thanks to Michael Widener, Rare Book Librarian, Rare Book Collection, Lillian
Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, for bringing this image to my attention.
Figure 2 is provided and reproduced courtesy of the Rare Book Collection, Lillian
Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School.
13. Several variations can be found in seventeenth century Dutch law books.
At least two have similar representations of Justice in the background. SeeJoHAN
VAN DEN SANDE, RERVM IN SvPREMA FRISIORUM CURIA IUDICATARUM LIBRI V [FIvE
BOOKS OF MATTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FREISLAND] (Leovardiae: impensis
loannis Iansscnil 1635);JoHAN VAN DEN SANDE, (VUF BOECKEN DER GEWUSDER SAKEN
VOOR DEN HoVE VAN VRIESLANDT [FIVE BOOKS ON LEGAL ISSUES FOR THE COURT OF
FRIESLAND] (Leeuwarden, Eyvo Takus Wielsma 1670). Two other engraved title
pages contain a similar court scene without a depiction of the Virtue Justice. See
JACOB COREN, D. lACOBI COOREN IN SUPREMO SENATU HOLLANDIAE: ZEELANDIAE, FRI-
SIAE, DUM VIVrERET ASSESSORIS: OBSERVATIONES RERUM IN EODEM SENATU JUDICAT-
ARUM: ITEM CONSILIA QUAEDAM: AUCTIORA & EMENDATIORA [COMMENTARY ON THE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF HOLLAND, ZEELAND, AND WEsT-FRIESLAND]
(Amstelaedami: Apud J. Ravesteinium 1661); HUGO GROTIUS, INLEIDING TOT DE
5
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courtroom (complete with dogs in the front) shows the social space pro-
vided by town halls and their courts, which served as communal gathering
spots.
A tiny figure stands behind the judge at the center. She is recogniza-
ble as 'Justice" by virtue of her scales and sword. This icon has had an
extraordinary run as political propaganda, spanning continents and centu-
ries from then to now. 14 That point can be made by continuing to use
seventeenth-century Holland as an example and by moving from the
printed page to buildings. A huge stone Justice (fig.3) crowns the tympa-
Figure 3. Prudence and Justice, attributed to Artus Quellinus, front tympanum of
the Town Hall (Royal Palace) of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Photograph repro-
duced with the permission of the Amsterdam City Archives.
num of the building, below the cupola facing Dam Square near the roof
line of the Town Hall of Amsterdam, a multi-function building that served
as that town's major courthouse and opened around the same time (1655)
that the Zutphen book was published. 15
A view of the facade (fig.4) enables one to grasp the enormity of the
building on which this Justice stands. The Town Hall of Amsterdam (also
called the Royal Palace) faces Dam Square. Remarkable for its grandeur,
HOLLANDSCHE RECHTS-GELEERTHEYD [INTRODUTION TO DUTCH LAw] (S'Graven-hage:
By de weduwe van H.P. van Wou 1631).
14. See Resnik & Curtis, Representing Justice, supra note t; Dennis E. Curtis &
Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987).
15. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Amsterdam Town Hall are reproduced with
the permission of the Amsterdam City Archives and were obtained with the assis-
tance of staff at the Amsterdam Historisch Museum and the Amsterdam City
Archives.
[Vol. 53: p. 771
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol53/iss5/1
2008] COURTS: IN AND OUT OF SIGHT, SITE, AND CITE
rigure 4. Exterior not ot tme Amsterclam town Hall, It46-1O9. Architect:
Jacob van Campen. Photograph reproduced with the permission of the Am-
sterdam City Archives.
this Town Hall was an "undertaking of megalomanic proportions"' 6 and is
exceptionally well-documented in the annals, of art history. The Town
Hall of Amsterdam is exemplary of much more ordinary spaces-hun-
dreds of civic buildings around Europe that augmented churches and
markets as places for communal activities.
These multi-purpose buildings typically included rooms for holding
court and pronouncing judgments, as can be seen by turning to the next
image (fig.5), which depicts the entrance to the Magistrates' Chamber.
Everyone knew the purpose of this room because of the figure at the
center of the display-another Justice with scales and a sword. Moving
down to the ground floor, one finds a marble chamber (fig.6), with win-
dows open to the street so that outsiders could watch what occurred
within. 17 This tribunal was the chamber where sentences of death were
pronounced.' 8 From figure 7, one can see what those looking in from
16. See EYMERT-JAN GoOSSENS, TREASURES WROUGHT BY CHISEL AND BRUSH:
THE Tow r HALL OF AMSTERDAM IN THE GOLDEN AGE 12 (1996). The images of the
west wall sculpture (fig.7) and the sculptures on it-King Solomon's justice (fig.8),
Zaleucus (fig.9) and Brutus (fig.10)-all attributed to Artus Quellinus, are repro-
duced with the permission of the copyright holder, the Royal Palace Foundation of
Amsterdam. My thanks to the Royal Palace Foundation and to Dr. Eymert-Jan
Goossens, who has also generously assisted me in the research on the Town Hall.
17. See KATHARINE FREMANTLE, THE BAROQUE TOWN HALL OF AMSTERDAM 80
(1959).
18. The details of the ceremony are provided in Katharine Fremantle, The
Open Vierschaar of Amsterdam's Seventeenth-Century Town Hall as a Setting for the City's
Justice, 77 OUD HOLLAND 206, 229-31 (1962). After the death sentence was an-
nounced, city bells rang and the sheriff went to the window of the "publication
gallery," displayed the Rod ofJustice and all sentences were read "out." Id. at 230.
7
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Figure 5 (left) Entrance to the Magistrates' Chamber; figure 6 (center) Interior
of the Tribunal. Photographs reproduced with the permission of the Amsterdam
City Archives. Figure 7 (right) Artus Quellinus, west wall sculpture, the Tribunal
(circa 1655). Photograph copyright: Royal Palace Foundation of Amsterdam.
outside, as well as what the accused, faced-three stone reliefs telling Bib-
lical, Greek and Roman stories.
What stories did the burgomasters who ruled in Amsterdam tell to
those who watched their magistrates impose the death penalty? The
center panel-King Solomon's Justice from the Old Testament (fig.8)-re-
mains familiar. Next to Solomon was another then-commonplace scene in
Figure 8 (left) King Solomon's justice- figure 9 (center) Zaleucus; figure 10 (right)
Brutus (circa 1655). Photographs copyright: Royal Palace Foundation of
Amsterdam.
town halls that today is less readily recognized. Depicted is the Greek story
of Zaleucus (fig.9), who was said to have found his own son guilty of violat-
ing his edicts. The punishment mandated was to gouge out the wrong-
doer's eyes. At the behest of his counselors (goes the story), Zaleucus
mitigated the penalty by having taken out one of his own eyes as well as
one eye of his son.19 The third relief (fig.10) shows the Roman envoy,
19. The story, as told by Valerius Maximus, is excerpted below.
Nothing could be braver than the following examples ofjustice. Zaleucus
protected the city of Locri with very salutary and useful laws. His son was
convicted on a charge of adultery and according to a law constituted by
Zaleucus himself was due to lose both eyes. The whole community
wished to spare the young man the necessity of punishment in honour of
his father. For some time, Zaleucus resisted, but in the end, overborne by
the people's entreaties, he first gouged out one of his own eyes, then one
of his son's, leaving the faculty of sight for them both.
8
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Brutus, ordering the death of his sons because they had joined a conspir-
acy against Rome.
20
While the Town Hall of Amsterdam was, as noted, an extraordinary
building, its content was not idiosyncratic. Rather, these scenes were
placed on the walls of town halls around Europe. 2 1 The normative lessons
embodied in these allegories conveyed messages both authoritarian and
utilitarian. These scenes instructed that obedience to the law of the state
was required even at the price of personal pain, experienced not only by
the accused but also by judges. Order your own sons to death to enforce
the rule of the state. Gouge out his and your own eye.
Moreover, were one to forget who was in charge, another frequently
shown scene-the Judgment of Cambyses (fig. 11)-demonstrated the conse-
quences of judicial misbehavior. The vivid diptych by Gerard David hung
in the Town Hall of Bruges at the end of the fifteenth century. 22 On a
first panel, in a scene at the back, a corrupt judge, Sisamnes, is shown
2 VALERIUS MAXIMUS, MEMORABLE DOINGS AND SAYINGS 64-65, 6:5 ext. 3 (D.R.
Schackleton Bailey, trans., 2000 from a first century CE text) [hereinafter MEMORA-
BLE DOINGS AND SAYINGS]. A description was also provided in Gesta Romanorum,
compiled during the first half of the fourteenth century in Latin and then trans-
lated in various European vernaculars. In that version, the "violated woman was a
virgin" and a "daughter of a widow." SeeJerzy Miziolek, Exempla Iustitiae at Arthur's
Court in the Context of Dutch and Flemish, German, and Italian Art, in NETHERLANDISH
ARTISTS IN GDANSK IN THE TIME OF HANS VREDEMAN DE VRIES 73, 77-78, 153 fig.9
(2006).
20. For an account of the story, see Livy, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ROME 101,
1.60 (Aubrey De S61incourt trans., Penguin Books 1975) and MEMORABLE DOINGS
AND SAYINGS, supra note 19, at 386-87, IV.4.1. A critical reading of Livy's account is
provided in IAN DONALDSON, THE RAPES OF LUCRETIA: A MYTH AND ITS TRANSFORMA-
TIONS 110-12 (1982). Although the book bears the title of the story of Lucretia, its
other focal point is the myth of Brutus as it traced the ways in which the two stories
together purported "to explain the origins of the Roman Republic." Id. at 14.
21. A Judgment of Solomon was displayed, for example, in Alkmaar, Augsburg,
Basel, Bremen, Breslau, Edam, Elbing, Frankfurt, Danzig, The Hague, Leyden,
Leipzig, Lunenburg, Muenster, Rothenburg, Thorn, Ulm, and Ueberlingen.
Paintings of a Judgment of Zaleucus could be found in the Town Hall in Haarlem,
Emden, Danzig, Hoorn, Eglisau, and in Nuremberg along with a Judgment ofSolo-
mon and likely a Cambyses. See generally Hugo van der Velden, Cambyses for Example:
The Origins and Function of Exemplum Iustitiae in Netherlandish Art of the Fifteenth, Six-
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY FOR THE
HIST. OF ART 19-20 (1995) [hereinafter Van der Velden, CambysesforExample]. The
imagery was also placed on medals. See Edward Gans & Guido Kisch, The Cambyses
Justice Medal, 29 ART BULL. 121, 122 (1947). Scenes telling the Brutus story could
be found in the Nuremberg Town Hall in a rendition by Hans Sebald Beham, in
stained-glass window in Emden, and in the magistrates' chambers in Leiden in a
painting by Karel de Moor, who lived in the second half of the seventeenth cen-
tury. See Van der Velden, Cambyses for Example, supra, at 34 n. 114.
22. See HANS JoRis VAN MIEGROET, GERARD DAVID 143 (1989); W.H. JAMES
WEALE, GERARD DAVID: PAINTER AND ILLUMINATOR 6-7 (1895). See generally Van der
Velden, Cambyses for Example, supra note 21; Hugo van der Velden, Cambyses Recon-
sidered: Gerard David's Exemplum Iustitiae for Bruges Town Hall, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETHER-
LANDS QUARTERLY FOR HIST. ART 40 (1995). These panels, Arrest of the Corrupt Judge
(fig.11) and Flaying of the Corrupt Judge (fig.12 ) that comprise The Justice (Judgment)
of Cambyses are reproduced with permission from the copyright holder, Musea
9
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accepting a bag of money. In the foreground, that judge is removed from
the bench at the behest of the ruling monarch, Cambyses, a figure in an
ancient story told by Herodotus. 23 The second panel (fig.12) features the
judge being flayed alive. In the rear of that panel, the judge's son Otanes
has been anointed the new judge and forced by Cambyses to assume the
seat of power on a bench made from the skin of his father.
Figure 11 (left) Arrest of the Corrupt Judge, left panel, and figure 12 (right) 'Raying
of the Corrupt judge, right panel of the diptych The Justice (Judgment) of Cambyses,
Gerard David, 1498. Copyright: Musea Brugge, Groeningemuseum and re-
printed with its permission.
The Cambyses story could be interpreted to be a decision of a lunatic,
which-according to Herodotus-Cambyses was. But in Renaissance Eu-
rope, the story was mostly described as showing the "wise" king Cambyses
in control of the corruptjudge. 2 4 For example, in a major Danish tapestry
commissioned by King Frederick II in 1581, Cambyses served as the exem-
plar of the prudent ruler.
2 5
Brugge, Groeningemuseum. Thanks to Griet Teetaert at the Musea Brugge, for
help in obtaining permission to reprint the panels.
23. Cambyses was the son of Cyrus the Great, who conquered Babylon in 539
BCE. Cambyses ruled from around 530 to 521 BCE. See HERODOTUS, 3 THE HISTO-
RIES 95, 170, 171 Uohn Marincola ed., Aubrey de Selincourt trans., Penguin Clas-
sics 2003) [hereinafter HERODOTUS, HISTORIES]; see also GERALDINE PINCH,
EGYPTIAN MYTHOLOGY: A GUIDE TO THE GODS, GODDESSES, AND TRADITIONS OF AN-
CIENT EGYPT 34 (2002). Pinch noted evidence that a king who appeared to have
been Cambyses existed and that he conquered Egypt in 525 BCE, but described
the report that Cambyses had showed contempt for Egyptian gods by "stabbing the
sacred Apis btll" to be a legend not substantiated by available evidence.
24. Gans & Kisch, supra note 21, at 122; Van der Velden, Cambyses for Example,
supra note 21, at 11-16.
25. That tapestry, the Throne Baldachin, was woven by the Danish workshop
at Helsingor from 1585 to 1586. When finished, the tapestry consisted of a back-
cloth more than nine feet by eleven feet and a canopy of more than thirteen by
Vol. 53: p. 771
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Why should lawyers in the twenty-first century know about what pic-
tures and carvings were placed in European town halls? These were public
displays of political principles, provided through well-known narratives re-
peatedly told tojudges, disputants, and to the general public about enforc-
ing the law of the state. Why was adjudication public? Not because of
democratic values about the political importance of transparent and ac-
countable decision-making by governing powers. Rulers used these public
rituals to show their power, insist on their capacity to command obedi-
ence, and give content to the practices with which they sought
compliance.
The imagery can also be characterized as patriarchal or aristocratic.
The familial scenes served to analogize rulers to parental figures, who
were to be understood as obliged to impose punishments when violations
of the law occurred but who took no joy from causing pain to their sub-
jects/children. The sword held by the ubiquitous Justice reiterated the
theme of law's power and its violence.
These juridical examples (in Latin, exempla iustitiae) help to make
plain that pre-democratic adjudication ought not to be equated with adju-
dication under democratic precepts. These narratives insisted on judicial
subservience rather than judicial independence. Only in later eras did a
view develop that the judge was a specially-situated employee of the state,
paid by the state yet insulated from its ordinary exercise of authority.
But glimmers of what is admired in both adjudication and democracy
can also be found by looking back at this iconography of justice. The
scales of Justice have something in common with political theories like
democracy that impose constraints on power. Balancing and weighing re-
flect the idea that sheer power or arbitrary whim did not suffice to support
legitimate exercises of state authority. Outcomes were supposed to be
based on relevant facts intersecting with governing customs and rules.
Moreover, forms of respect were owed to disputants. That point can also
be found in texts literally etched into town halls, such as that shown in
nine feet that "was intended to hang above the royal table at which [Frederick II]
and his wife, Queen Sophie, would sit." See Elizabeth Cleland, Throne Baldachin, in
TAPESTRY IN THE BAROQUE: THREADS OF SPLENDOR 33 (Thomas P. Campbell ed.)
(catalogue to accompany an exhibit at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2008).
Justice plays a prominent role, for she is depicted as a blond-haired centerpiece
between the imagery celebrating the justice and greatness of the king and queen's
lineages. Justice, in turn, is herself flanked by Temperance to the left and Forti-
tude to the right. In the canopy, classical 'justice stories" are depicted on four
medallions (id. at 34), including a medallion in which a crowned Cambyses ges-
tures to the flayed body of Sisamnes that hangs above a judicial throne. The in-
scription below reads "CAMBVSIS VORSICHTIGKEIT" (Cambyses Prudence). Id. at 35.
From 1586 to 1658, the tapestry remained in the Danish Helsingor Castle. In
1658, the troops of Swedish King Karl Gustav X removed it to Sweden. SeeThrone
Baldachin, http://metmuseum.org/special/tapestry/view-l.asp?item=0 (last vis-
ited June 28, 2008).
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figure 13-the Latin phrase, Audi et Alteram partem-"hear the other side
as well."
2 6
Figure 13. Arch of Entrance, Town Hall (Stadhuis), Gouda, 1449-1459. Architect:
Jan Keldermans. Image reproduced courtesy of Regional Archive, Middle Holland
Gouda, the Netherlands.
Further, echoing biblical injunctions, judges were told to treat the
rich and the poor litigant alike and not to seek or to accept special favors.
That message is made particularly stark in a 1604 fresco (fig.14), called Les
Juges aux mains coupdes (Judges with Their Hands Cut Off) from the Town
Hall of Geneva. At one side of the handless judges is a banner inscribed
with a warning from the Old Testament: that the taking of gifts "blindeth
the wise, and perverteth the words of the righteous."2 7 To summarize the
tip of what is a vast visual iceberg, in the town halls that were also Medieval
and Renaissance Europe's courts of law, governing powers displayed di-
dactic messages aimed at instructing participants and spectators about
their power to create order and to insist that everyone-those judged as
well as those who were the judges-obeyed. These rulers relied on public
26. The photograph of the inscription over the arched entrance to the Gouda
Town Hall (Stadhuis) (fig.13), is reproduced with permission of the copyright
holder, the Regional Archive, Middle Holland, Gouda, the Netherlands. Thanks
to Chavi Keeney Nana (Yale Law School, Class of 2009) and to Cristel Stolk and
Joke Radstaatand of the Regional Archive for help in identifying and obtaining
permission to reprint the image. The Town Hall of Amsterdam provides another
example. See FREMANTLE, supra note 17, at 76 (describing phrase in gold lettering
above the entrance to the Magistrates' Court).
27. See NATALIE ZEMON DAvIS, THE GIFT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 85
(2000) (providing translation of transcription, taken from Exodus 23:8). The
fresco, from 1604 and by Cesar Giglio, was commissioned for the chambers; subse-
quent refurbishing covered the wall, and the image was not found again until
1901. See BARBARA ROTH-LOCHNER & Livio FORNARA, THE TOWN HALL OF GENEVA
10-11 (Jean Gunn trans., 1986). LesJuges aux mains coupdes (fig.14) is reproduced
with the permission of Le Centre d'iconographie genevoise. Thanks to Ursula
Baume-Cousam, Cdsar Manz, and Livio Fornara for help in obtaining permission
to reprint.
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spectacles to make those claims, and much of their instruction was about
their own very non-democratic power. 28 Public performances of the rule
of law helped to build and consolidate the authority of the state.
Figure 14. Les Juges aux mains coupees, Cesar Giglio, circa 1604,
Salle du Conseil (Council Chamber), Town Hall of Geneva,
Switzerland. Photograph reproduced courtesy of the Centre
d'Iconographie Genevoise.
Detail: LesJuges aux mains coupdes.
III. DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC NORms
But those who produce images and spectacles do not control their
meaning or effects. As diverse audiences watched these displays, they
came to develop views about legitimate decision-making-and came to be-
lieve that they had a role to play. Although the public displays were ini-
tially "rites" in which observers had no ability to make demands on rulers
28. Thus, and unlike some scholars of the trial-who have argued that "there
was no political principle involved in the origins of the adversarial trial"-I think at
least in the continent, the "political principle" was to demonstrate power. See Lind-
say Farmer, Secret Trials and Public Justice (Fall 2007) (unpublished paper, on file
with author).
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for what today we call "transparency" and "accountability," over time the
audience moved into a more participatory stance.
Those shifts can be seen by moving forward to nineteenth-century En-
gland. Writing in the early part of that century, Jeremy Bentham insisted
on the importance of what he called "publicity" in trials. What he said
then is echoed regularly today when courts in the United States explain or
insist on public processes. Bentham argued that public adjudication pro-
duced more accurate decisions. The wider the circle of dissemination of a
witness's testimony, he posited, the greater the likelihood that a falsehood
would be ferreted out: "[m] any a known face, and every unknown counte-
nance, presents to him a possible source of detection." 29
Bentham also saw public processes as protection for, as well as against,
judges. He urged that ordinary spectators be permitted to make notes
that could be distributed widely. These "minutes" could serve as insurance
for the good judge and as a corrective against "misrepresentations" made
by "an unrighteous judge."30 By suggesting that trials put the state
(through its representative, the judge) on display, Bentham raised the
specter that both judges and the state could be subjected to judgment.
This point is radical when measured against the baseline of Renais-
sance Europe, when people who observed trials were not presumed to
hold the power to sit in judgment ofjudges or to assess the decency of the
state's procedures. By Bentham's time, however, the audience was no
longer conceptualized in as passive a role as that of spectator. The re-
sponses of observers had weight and relevance as popular opinions came
to matter through the development of a "public sphere" that could affect
political rulers.3 1
Bentham believed that the public features of adjudication would gen-
erate a desirable form of communication between citizen and the state.
Bentham did not suggest imposing a legal obligation on judges to "de-
liver" opinions but he thought that, when judges gave decisions in public,
they would want their audience to understand the reasons behind their
judicial actions. Thus, it would be "natural" for judges to gain "the habit
of giving reasons from the bench."32
29. SeeJEREMY BENTHAM, Chapter X "Of Publicity and Privacy, as Applied tojudica-
ture in General, and to the Collection of the Evidence in Particular," in 6 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 351, 355 (William Tait, 1843).
30. Id.
31. SeeJORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger
trans.,1989); DAVID ZARET, ORIGINS OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE: PRINTING, PETITIONS,
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND (2000). See generally HABERMAS
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992); LUKE GOODE, JURGEN
HABERMAS: DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2005).
32. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 357.
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IV. DEMOCRACY'S TRANSFORMATION OF ADJUDICATION
Bentham is, of course, part of a broader picture of transformations in
social orders that took place during the last three centuries. As Michel
Foucault has famously recounted, given that open processes of punish-
ment produced opportunities for an "unruly crowd" to vent distress, pun-
ishment was privatized to enhance the ability of the state to reassert
control and discipline. 33 Yet, some aspects of displaying the spectacle of
adjudication became sufficiently entrenched that they turned into
obligations.
The proposition that judicial power entails an open process moved
from being a means to an end in itself, as can be seen from the text of the
American Constitution-with its Sixth Amendment establishing that the
accused has a right to a "public trial."34 Many state constitutions go fur-
ther by making explicit rights of access through "open" or "public"
courts. 35 In the twentieth century, Article 6 of the European Convention
on Human Rights demonstrated the transnational codification of this
principle. In 1950, it set forth the proposition that "[i] n the determination
of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
36 Of
course, such provisions also recognize the legitimacy of closures-as had
Bentham-under specified circumstances.
3 7
33. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 8
(Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1977).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
35. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, de-
nial or delay."); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("All courts shall be public, and every person
shall have speedy remedy therein for wrongs sustained.").
36. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on
Human Rights]; see also Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. 1/6316 (1966) ("Everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.").
37. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 36, art. 6(1)
('judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be ex-
cluded from all or parts of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the
protection of the life of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in
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Pierre Bourdieu's term "reflexivity" is apt, in that the practices of
open courts have become a signature feature that helps to define an insti-
tution as a court.38 Moreover, rights of publicity are not limited only to
proceedings denominated as "trials" but, through constitutional and com-
mon law elaboration, 39 also apply to provide the public with access to
other forms of evidentiary hearings and to court records. 40 New tech-
niques of dissemination have also been developed. 4 1 In addition to the
open doors and windows of courtrooms, during the twentieth century, the
rise of the newspaper business and of the commercial publication of deci-
sions created more ways in which knowledge about what took place in
courts came before the public.
Today's technologies have many times amplified the possibilities. In
addition to the web and electronic databases, some jurisdictions televise
court proceedings. We can be "virtual" observers by watching from our
own homes through televised proceedings from, for example, the Su-
preme Court of Canada, 42 the International Criminal Tribunal for the
the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice.")
38. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 838 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
39. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986); see also Hartford
Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that "docket
sheets enjoy a presumption of openness and that the public and the media possess
a qualified First Amendment right to inspect them" and explaining utility of such
an approach).
40. See generally Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L.
REv. 405 (1987); see alsoJoseph F. Anderson, Jr., Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping
Point?, 53 VILL. L. REv. 811 (2008).
41. See generally Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records-From Documents
to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 ViL. L. REv. 855 (2008). Making different forms
of information available does not necessarily make all decision-making transparent.
42. In Canada, Supreme Court proceedings are televised. As to the method,
most "courtroom proceedings are televised by the Canadian Parliamentary Affairs
Channel (CPAC)." See Supreme Court of Canada, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/faq/faq/index-eng.asp#f7 (last visited June 28, 2008).
See generally A. Wayne MacKay, Framing the Issues for Cameras in our Courtrooms: Rede-
fining Judicial Dignity and Decorum, 19 DALHOUSIE L.J. 139 (1996) (exploring
whether, under Section 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights, providing for freedom
of press and of expression, electronic media ought to have access to court proceed-
ings). For an exploration of how such technologies affect the content and mean-
ing of trials, see Linda Mulcahy, An Unbearable Lightness of Being? Shifts Towards the
Virtual Trial (paper presented at the Birkbeck College Symposium, Adjudicatory
Practices in Transition: Courts and the Public Sphere, to be published at 35 J.L.
Soc'y. (forthcoming 2008, manuscript on file with author).
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Former Yugoslavia, 43 and a few of the states in America. 44
Furthermore, these rights reflected a shift in theories of sovereignty
that made untenable the proposition that judges were the loyal servants of
the state, subject to the power of the crown. Rather, judges came to be
understood as occupying a unique role, authorized to sit in judgment of
the very power that employed them. The 1701 Act of Settlement in En-
gland is one form of that independence, 45 and Article III of the United
States Constitution-promising judges tenure during good behavior and
salaries protected against diminution 46-offers another. Like the public-
ity aspects of courts, judicial independence also became definitional of
courts in democracies. Moreover, these two facets-judicial indepen-
dence and public proceedings-interact. Open processes serve as a mech-
anism to make plain that a government must acknowledge the
independent power of the judge, or open processes can reveal state efforts
to try to impose its will on judges.
Yet some aspects of adjudication post-democracy are continuous with
its history pre-democracy. I will detail this point through a focus on the
United States. Just like the burgomasters of Amsterdam, the federal gov-
ernment also sought to use its economic wherewithal and its power to es-
tablish big public spaces both to make and to mark its power. Its buildings
and its public displays of law enforcement were a means to an end: creat-
ing a unified nation with central authority residing in the federal
government.
Specifically, in the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress repeatedly
turned to the federal courts as instruments of enforcement of federal
norms. One technique of generating "a federal presence" 4 7 was to con-
43. All proceedings other than deliberations "shall be held in public, unless
otherwise provided." Rule 78 (Open Sessions), Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
ICTY, IT/32/Rev.36, available at http:/www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm
(follow "Rules of Procedure and Evidence rev. 36" hyperlink). When needed for
protection of victims or witnesses or for reasons of security or justice, the trial
chambers may make provisions for private or in camera processes. See id. at Rule
75 (Measures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses), Rule 79 (Closed Ses-
sions). Full transcripts-and when appropriate, video recordings-are made. See
id. at Rule 81 (Records of Proceedings and Evidence). The tribunal's working
languages are English and French; in addition, the accused has a right to use his or
her own language. See id. at Rule 3(B) (Languages). Transmission is provided via
weblink, enabling the public, including people in the former territories, to see the
proceedings; the languages offered include French, English and Serbo-Croatian.
When witnesses or proceedings raise security problems, the screened images are
scrambled as may be the voices of witnesses. See id. at Rule 75(B)(i) (c) (Measures
for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses).
44. See Robert L. Brown, Just a Matter of Time? Video Cameras at the United States
Supreme Court and the State Supreme Courts, 9 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 1 (2007).
45. Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (Eng.).
46. U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 1, cl. 2.
47. This phrase comes from the title of a book. See Lois Craig, THE FEDERAL
PRESENCE: ARCHITECTURE, POLITICS, AND SYMBOLS IN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BUILDING (1978).
17
Resnik: Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite - The Norman Shachoy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
struct federal buildings around the United States. Between 1852 and
1939, construction was under the superintendence of the Office of the
Supervising Architect in the Treasury Department.
In the initial phase, those federal buildings were, like the town halls
of the Renaissance, multi-purpose spaces. 4 8 Through the work of the Fed-
eral Judicial Center (the FJC), we know that these multi-purpose buildings
("combining the functions of courthouse, customhouse, and post office")
were aimed at extending "the authority of the federal government to every
region of the country."49 Towns and cities sought to be the sites for fed-
eral offices as sources of commercial development, and the new "hand-
some buildings ... offered prestige to the federal courts, which previously
had met in an assortment of state offices and rented buildings."
50
The title of this Lecture refers to courts in "sight" and in "site." Thus,
I provide a few pictorial examples of this building project that criss-
crossed the country during the course of almost one hundred years.
The selection starts with an 1861 federal building (fig.15) funded
in Galveston soon after Texas became a state.5 ' Another example comes
from a 1913 building (fig.16) in Missoula, Montana that a local paper de-
scribed as an "ornament to the city."' 52 This travelogue continues in
48. In terms of administration of these buildings, in 1849 Congress created a
federal Department of Interior, charged with the management of public lands and
parks. That department also took on the fiscal responsibility for the administra-
tion of the very small federal court system as it then existed. See The Federal Judi-
cial Center, Executive Agencies and Judicial Administration, Executive Branch
Administration of the FederalJudiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (last
visited June 28, 2008). When the Department of Justice was created in the later
part of the nineteenth century, it took over the administrative activities related to
courts and, in 1939, Congress created the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
to oversee the judicial branch's budgets, facilities, and personnel.
49. See FederalJudicial Center, Constructing Justice: The Architecture of Fed-
eral Courthouses 1-3 (A Description of Historical Photographs Exhibited at the
Federal Judicial Center, undated essay) and Constructing Justice: An Exhibit of Court-
house Photographs at the Federal Judicial Center, 8 THE COURT HISTORIAN 1 (1995)
(hereinafter Constructing Justice). The set of photographs is also available through
an online database available at http://www.fjc.gov/history/courthouses.nsf.
50. Constructing Justice at 1.
51. Texas became independent from Mexico in 1836, was later annexed by
the United States, and in 1845 given statehood.
52. These images of historic courthouses-in Galveston, Texas (fig.15), Mis-
soula, Montana (fig.16), San Diego, California (fig.17), and San Juan, Puerto Rico
(fig.18)-can be found at FederalJudicial Center ("FJC"), Historic Federal Court-
houses, http://www.fjc.gov/history/courthouses.nsf (last visited June 28, 2008).
Thanks are due to Steven G. Saltzgiver, FJC Research Historian, and Bruce A. Rag-
sdale, Director of the History Office of the FJC, for help in locating and reproduc-
ing these photographs.
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Figure 15 (left) United States Customhouse, Galveston, Texas, 1854-
1861. Supervising Architect: Ammi B. Young. Figure 16 (right)
United States Federal Building, Post Office, and Courthouse, Mis-
soula, Montana, 1911-1913. Supervising Architect:James Knox Taylor.
Images courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.
San Diego, California (fig.17) in 1913 and then moves east, where in 1914,
a new courthouse was provided for the territorial court (fig.18) in San
Juan, Puerto Rico.
This brief tour around the United States aims to make plain that, de-
spite variations in style, a reiterated motif is the construction of important
public spaces representing federal authority. As all those windows and
doors also suggest, the federal buildings were readily accessible to foot
traffic, from the litigant to the person mailing a letter. And up until the
1980s, one could enter those buildings freely without emptying one's
Figure 17 (left) United States Post Office and Customhouse, 1911-
1913, renovated 1994, renamed in 1986 the Jacob Weinberger United
States Courthouse, San Diego, California. Supervising Architect:
James Knox Taylor. Figure 18 (right) United States Post Office and
Courthouse, 1911-1914, enlarged 1938-1940, renamed in 1999 theJose
V. Toledo Federal Building and United States Courthouse, San Juan,
Puerto Rico. Supervising Architect: James Knox Taylor. Images cour-
tesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.
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pockets or passing screening devices. Over the decades, the construction
of multi-purpose government spaces became more unusual, and buildings
gained a singular identity as courthouses. What is now familiar to us was
novel not too many centuries or even decades ago. The courthouse-as a
segregated and specially named space 53 separate from the post office, the
customs house, and the jail-was once uncommon.
What is implicit in this rendition of buildings is another point: that
these building programs also tell us something about the demand for ad-
judication (as well as for postal services). The examples from San Diego
and Puerto Rico show courthouses sprouting beyond the three to four-
story models. The development of democracy changed the needs for, ac-
cess to, and modes of adjudication. Moreover, democracy opened up the
prospect of justice-seeking for wholly new sets of claimants, who gained
rights to use litigation to call state officials to account in order to hold
government to its own promises. The result has been an avalanche of
claims, ranging from veterans seeking benefits within administrative tribu-
nals to victims of crimes against humanity seeking acknowledgment in do-
mestic as well as in international courts for wrongdoing of horrific
dimensions.
The size and scale of cases has changed as well. In part through new
information technologies, patterns of injuries experienced by large num-
bers of individuals became visible, permitting us to connect incidents
heretofore perceived as isolated or idiosyncratic events. When once we
spoke of a "case," now we use the term "litigation"-the asbestos litigation,
tobacco litigation, Agent Orange litigation-capturing an enormous array
of parties and of varying forms of injury. Aggregation of claimants and
mass-provided remedies-through various mechanisms ranging from class
actions to administrative grids-are key facets of modern legal life that
have altered the resources of the participants and the stakes.54 Further,
the growth of the profession of lawyers provided the personnel that both
fueled and staffed the regulatory state and ferreted out aggregate forms of
injury. The transformation of the legal profession is a story unto itself, but
its expansion and diversification is a predicate to demands for judging.
Another factor, one that has been underappreciated in the literature
of courts, is women's rights. One can see many images of Justice as a wo-
man but women themselves could not, in many countries in many periods,
participate in courts as judges, jurors, witnesses or litigants. Women only
gained full juridical voice in the last century, and the radical reconception
53. See generally CLARE GRAHAM, ORDERING LAw: THE ARCHITECTURAL AND SO-
CIAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw COURT TO 1914 (2003).
54. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1991);Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah Hensler, Individuals
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representations, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296
(1996).
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of women as rights-holders-both in and outside of their families-has
driven up the volume of disputes. 55 When women of all colors join a
growing circle of "persons" of all ages and ethnicities as well as groups
themselves, one can see part of why the demand side has soared.
5 6
A recap of the changing landscape can quickly be seen through a bar
graph and a few more pictures. A simple graph (fig.19) maps the growth
Article M Authorized Judgeships: District, Circuit, and Supreme Courts:
1901, 1950, and 2001
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in only the life-tenured federal trial judges in the United States over about
one hundred years. The number of authorized judgeships rose from
under 100 in 1901 to now more than 650.
55. Whole fields of litigation-and most vividly "family law"-though now
taken for granted, did not much exist in the nineteenth century.
56. The changing composition of litigants has produced new criteria for judi-
cial selection. While once all the judges were of one class, race, ethnicity and sex,
today in countries around the world and in transnational courts, the call is for a
"diverse" judiciary. See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: De-
mand, Supply, and Life-Tenure, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 579 (2005).
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In days of fewer federal filings and fewer federal rights, United States fed-
eral courthouses like the 1906 building (fig.20) 5 7 in Grand Forks, North
Dakota sufficed.
Figure 20. The Grand Forks Federal and Court Building, 1906, renamed in 2002the Ronald N. Davies Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, Grand Forks,North Dakota. Architect: James Knox Taylor. Copyright: Steve Silverman,
www.stevesilvermanimaging.com.
57. The photograph of the front exterior view of the Grand Forks Federal andCourt Building (fig.20), taken by Steve Silverman, is reproduced with his permis-sion and the permission of the building's Property Manager, Bryan Sayler. Photo-graph copyright: Steve Silverman, www.stevesilvermanimaging.com. TheHonorable Celeste Bremer, Magistrate Judge, Southern District of Iowa, andJanice Dinkel, Judiciary Regional Account Manager, Public Buildings Service, GSARocky Mountain Region, enabled us to obtain this image.
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Figure 21. Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Courthouse, St. Louis, Missouri, 2000.
Photograph courtesy of and reproduced with permission of the photographer.
In contrast, by 2000, a skyscraper provided a new federal court-
house in St. Louis, Missouri (fig.21)-the tallest in the nation. 5 8 In
Boston, another major building opened in 1998. The several-story
new federal courthouse was designed by Henry Cobb,
58. The Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse (architect: Hellmuth, Obata, +
Kassabaum), twenty-nine stories high and containing over a million square feet
square feet, is described on the GSA website as the "largest single" federal court-
house built. See U.S. General Services Administration, Thomas F. Eagleton U.S.
Courthouse, http://www.gsa.gov (search "Thomas Eagleton"; follow courthouse
hyperlink) (April 24, 2008). The courthouse cost $200,000,000 to construct and
opened in 2000. See City of St. Louis Development Activity, Eagleton Federal
Courthouse, http://stcin.missouri.org/devprojects/projinfo.cfm?DevProjectlD=
47 (last visited June 28, 2008). The photograph is provided by Magistrate Judge
David Noce of the Eastern District of Missouri and is reproduced with his permis-
sion as copyright holder.
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with vivid color panels by the artist Ellsworth Kelly (fig.22) .9 In the Boston
Figure 22. (top and left)
John Joseph Moakley United
States Courthouse, Boston,
Massachusetts, 1998. Archi-
tect: Henry N. Cobb, and
monochrome panels by Ells-
worth Kelley. Photograph
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal,
1998. Photograph repro-
duced with the permission of
the photographer and of the
artist.
59. See Stephen G. Breyer, Foreword to CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE: A
GUIDE FOR ARCHITECTS, THEIR CLIENTS, AND THE PUBLIC 9-12 (2006) [hereinafter
CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE]; Douglas P. Woodlock, Drawing Meaning from the
Heart of the Courthouse, in CELEBRATING THE COURTHOUSE, supra at 155-167; see also
Douglas P. Woodlock, The "Peculiar Embarrassment": An Architectural History of the
Federal Courts in Massachusetts, 74 MASS. L. REV. 268-78 (1989); Douglas P.
Woodlock, Lecture: The New Federal Courthouse in Boston (1995) (on file with
author). Photograph copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. The photographs of the
interior of the John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse (figs.22 & 23) were
taken by Steve Rosenthal and are reproduced with his permission and that of the
artist Ellsworth Kelly, and obtained with the assistance of the Honorable Douglas
P. Woodlock, United States District Judge of the District of Massachusetts.
[Vol. 53: p. 771
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courthouse, twenty-five trial courts look more or less like this one (fig.23),
aiming to make a space that exemplifies the idea of law as accessible. The
designers of this courthouse chose the arches and the courtrooms as cen-
tral icons of their building.
. ........ ... ...... ....
Figure 23. Interior of a courtroom, John Joseph Moakley United States
Courthouse. Photograph Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998
V. RECONFIGURING RIGHTS AND PROCESSES
But there is a disjuncture between all of the new buildings, the court-
rooms, and the rules and practices enveloped in constitutional precepts
and what is happening in adjudicatory processes in the United States. The
job of the judge has changed, for they are now multi-taskers-sometimes
managers of lawyers and of cases, sometimes mediators, sometimes refer-
ral sources sending people outside of courts to alternative fora. In the
United States and elsewhere, we have seen a failing faith in adjudicatory
procedure, a growth in an anti-adjudicatory rhetoric and the promotion-
by judges and lawyers-of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Local
rules of the Boston federal courts, for example, instructjudges to bring up
the topic of settlement of cases every time that judges meet with lawyers
and litigants.
Thus, concurrent with the historical narrative of the triumphant ex-
pansion of adjudication as a touchstone of thriving democracy is a compet-
ing narrative describing adjudication as in decline; with more dramatic
flair, such a narrative could be claimed to represent the "death of adjudi-
cation."60 In both public and private sectors, leaders in many countries
proffer conciliation as the exemplary model ofjudgment. Through medi-
60. Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death
of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 173, 192-93 (2003).
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ation or negotiation, private outcomes predicated on the parties' consent
are preferred to those imposed by judges through public judgment imple-
menting state-generated regulatory norms. This worldwide movement to-
ward ADR is propelled by political and social forces trumpeting
deregulation and privatization and is staffed by lawyers and other profes-
sionals seeking and shaping new markets.
When the Boston courtroom opened in 1998, about four of 100
cases-both civil and criminal-completed trials in that district. Given
twenty-five trial courtrooms available, each one was used for about seven
trials per year. The opening chart (fig.1) in this Lecture makes plain that
the data on trial rates in Boston are not anomalous. Moreover, the per-
centages have declined since the Boston Courthouse opened. Of course,
trials are not the only proceeding for which courtrooms are used. But
congressional investigations of the late 1990s documented that federal
courtrooms were in use for proceedings about fifty-four percent of the
time, and that measure included events that lasted two hours or less.
6 1
This loss of public processes is not limited to the trial level alone. Appel-
late litigation is moving towards decisions "on the papers," and many of
the judgments rendered thereafter are not published for use by other liti-
gants as precedents in the cases that follow.62
But it would be an error to deduce that the evidentiary activities of
adjudication have disappeared. Rather, a great many such procedures
have migrated from courts to agencies, which provide another form of
alternative dispute resolution. 63 That development has particular rele-
vance to the questions of public processes, public spaces, and the practices
of justice.
61. See General Accounting Office, Courtroom Construction: Better Court-
room Use Data Could Enhance Facility Planning and Decisionmaking GAO/GGD-
97-39, at 2-3 (1997); see also General Accounting Office, Courthouse Construction:
Sufficient Data and Analysis Would Help Resolve the Courtroom-Sharing Issue
GAO-01-70, at 8, 18 (2000).
62. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1435 (2003); see also Sarah E. Ricks, A Modest Propo-
sal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions While Courts
and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PRO-
CESS 17 (2007). On the lack of access to district court decisions, see Hillel Y. Levin,
Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. REv. 973 (2008).
63. SeeJudith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing and Vanishing: The Empirical and Nor-
mative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 783 (2004).
796 [Vol. 53: p. 771
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The growth of administrative adjudication can be seen by considering
the graph (fig.24), called Authorized Judgeships in Federal Court Houses and in
Federal Agencies (as of 2001). On one side is a count of judgeships author-
ized to work in federal courthouses; included are life-tenured judges ap-
pointed through the constitutional process specified in Article III as well
as magistrate and bankruptcy judges who serve for renewable terms that
are fixed through statutory provisions. About 1,650 authorized positions
exist, as contrasted with some 4,700 administrative law judges or hearing
officers who work in federal agencies.
Authorized Judgeships in Federal Court Houses
and in Federal Agencies (as of 2001)
2500
'""A,
Federal Court Judgeships (1648) AgencyJudgeships (4721)
ci Article fl] judges (853) *Administrative law judges (1351)
a Bankruptcy judges (324) o Hearng officers and Presiding judges (3370)
@ Magistrate judges (471)
Figure 24. Copyright Judith Resnik, 2007
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Another bar graph (fig.25) provides information on all kinds of "evi-
dentiary hearings" (not only trials) that took place in federal courthouses
such as those in St. Louis (fig.21) and in Boston (fig.22). Counted on the
courthouse side are the 100,000 hearings that took place before either life-
tenured judges or statutorily-chartered magistrate and bankruptcy judges.
Estimate of Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Courts and in
Four Federal Agencies (2001)
Federal Proceedings (approx. 100,000) Administrative Law Hearings (approx. 700,000)
06ankruoptcy judges (76,179 proceedings) I Social Security Administration (SSA) (493,923 proceedings)
ODistrict judges (12,948 proceedings) 0 Immigration a d Naturalization Services (INS) (216,319 proceedings)
UMagistrate judges (7,894 proceedings) Oaoard of Veteran Appeals (EVA) (6,046 proceedings)
5 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (1,974 proceedings)
Figure 25. Copyright Judith Resnik, 2007
The other bar shows some 700,000 evidentiary hearings that occurred
in four federal agencies-the Social Security Administration, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Immigration Service and the
Department of Veterans' Affairs. 64 Thus, although the taking of evidence
in federal courts may be "vanishing," many evidentiary processes have mi-
grated into agencies that have functionally become courts. Courts have
thereby "outsourced" their products to agencies as well as to private sector
providers about which too little data are available to know the volume of
proceedings.
64. Thanks for help in compiling this chart are owed to Jennifer Peresie, Nat-
alie Ram and Bertrall Ross who did so assisted by advice from administrative law
experts Michael Asimow, Steven Croley, Gene Fidell, Jeffrey Lubbers, Elizabeth
Magill, Jerry Mashaw, and from Yale Law School librarian Camilla Tubbs.
[Vol. 53: p. 771
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Administrative adjudication takes place in federal office buildings
that are multifunction spaces, as were Renaissance town halls. But unlike
town halls, these office buildings are not often gracious statements of pub-
lic prosperity and good governance but rather dreary settings. Further,
when compared with the federal courthouse buildings, agency administra-
tion is impoverished-not only visually (in terms of the art and architec-
ture)-but in terms of the salaries paid to the judges, the lack of lawyers
for litigants, and the high volume and short duration of the proceedings.
As for public access, no ready way exists to be able to watch these
exchanges in which government officials-hearing officers, administrative
lawjudges and other agency employees-decide the rights and obligations
of hundreds of thousands of persons. In terms of the governing regula-
tory regime, some of the administrative hearings are presumptively open
(such as social security hearings) and others presumptively closed. But, as
a practical matter, even if one has the "right" to attend these various pro-
ceedings, it is difficult to find them. Unlike the courthouses with desig-
nated courtrooms for public observances, the office spaces used by
agencies do not invite "street traffic." And in terms of the decisions, no
commercial service collects all the judgments and either publishes them in
books or posts them on the internet.
Having tracked the reconfiguration of processes in court and the dev-
olution or outsourcing of processes to agencies, one more site needs to be
explored: private dispute resolution. In the United States, federal judges
who had once declined to enforce ex ante agreements to arbitrate federal
statutory rights generally now insist on holding parties to such bargains,
thereby outsourcing an array of claims. The result can be seen in the re-
production below of my own cell phone contract (figs.26 and 27).65 The
contract requires that I waive all rights to court, to class action treatment
or to aggregate treatment in arbitration, and that I use a private dispute
resolution procedure provided by the company. No member of the public
has a right to attend nor to obtain data about outcomes, costs, and
process.
65. See Verizon Wireless eStore, Your Verizon Wireless Customer Agreement,
http://www.vzwshop.com/pops/customeragreementpopup.aspx (last visited
June 28, 2008). Other providers have similar limitations. See, e.g., Sprint, Terms
and Conditions: Terms and Conditions of Service, http://www.sprintpcs.com/
common/popups/popLegalTermsPrivacy.html#2 (last visited June 28, 2008). On
the enforcement of such provisions, see generally Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp., 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005). That decision enforces an arbitration
clause despite arguments by employees seeking class treatment of claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act, as well as individual claims under Fair Labor Standards Act and Title
VII; and Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Con-
sumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 75 (2004).
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Examp e of CellLar Phone Contract: 2002
Your Cellular Service
Agreement
Please read carefiully
before filing in a safe place.
YOUR CELLULAR SERVICE AGREEMENT
Ths agrcmet for cellulr sevicebetwen you and [your] wirees [company] sets ycur and ar
legal rights conemig ymits, credits, chaiges, staring and ending service, early t-mirmtin fees,
limittiors ofliability, settlerret cf dispuesby neutral arbiraionhstead ofjtrytrials ard dass
actins, and othe i rpmanr mpics PLEASE READ TIHIS AGREEMEN[ AND YOUR PRICE
PLAN. IF YOU DISAREE WITH THEM, YOU DONT HAVE TO ACCEPT IHI
ACREEMENF.
IF YOURE A NEW CUSTOMER, TIHIS AGEEMENT STARIS WHEN YOUC(PEN THE
INSIDE PACKAGE OF ANY CELL PIONE YOURECEIVED MTIITHIS ACREEMENr ....
IF YOU IOT WANT ID ACCEPT AND BE BOUNDBY THIS AG E EENT, DNT DO
ANY OF THOSETHINGS. INSTEAD, RETURN ANY CELL PHONE YOURECEIVED WITH
THIS AGREEMENT (WITHKUTr OPENING THE INSIDE PACKAGE) TO THE PLACE OF
PURCHASE WIfH 15 DAYS.
IF YOURE AN EXISTING CUSTOMERUNDER APRIOR FORMOF AGREEMENT, YOUR
ACCP'IINGTHIS AGREEMENT IS ONE OFTHE CONDIIONS FOR OUR GRANTNGYOU
ANY OF THE RLLOMG CHANCESIN SERVICE YOU MAYREQUEST: ANEW PRICE
PLAN A NEWPROMOKICN, AMIONAL LINES IN SERVICE ORANYOTHERCHANGE
W MAY DESIGNATE NMlEN YOUREQUEST IT (SUH AS A WA1VER OF CHARCES YO(J
OWE) ... YOU CAN GO0 BACK TO YOLR OLDS ERVICE UNDER YOUR PRIOR
AGREEMENT AND PRICE PLAN BY CONTACTNM US ANY TIME BEFORE PAYING
YOUR -IRST HiLL AFFER)WE MAKE THE CHANCE YOUREQUESTED. 01IERWIS;E IF
YOU PAYYOURBILL, YO.YRECOIRMING YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF'THI
AGREEMENI'. IF YOU DON'T WANT TO ACCEPT THISAGREEMENI, THEN XONT
MAKE SIJ2H ACHANGE AND WE'LL CON'IINUE TO HONOR YOUR OLD FRM OF
AGREEMENT' ESS OR UNTILYOU MAKESLH A IANGE....
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Exarmple of Cdlular Phone Contract: 2002 (cont.)
INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION
IITEAD OF SUNG IN COURT, YOU'REAGRIEING TO ARBITRATE DIPUIES ARISING OUT
OFORRHATIhTOTtISOR PIOR AGREEfS.TS AGREElINE INVOLVES
CCMMWEAND THE FEDERAL AR rTRAT1CN ACT APPIES TOIT. ARBITRATION I'T
ThE SAMvE AS COURT. TIE RULES ARE DIFFERENI AND THIRES NOJUDGE AND JURY. YOU
AND WE ARE WAIVING RIGHIS TOPARTCIPATE IN CLASS ACTICNS, INQLDINGPUTATIVE
CLASS ACTIONS BE(GNBY OIXERS PRIR TOTHISAGFAINI', SO READ THIS
CAREFULLY. T1 SACEEMEAFFECTSRICIS YOJ MIGHTOTIER EHAVEINSUIH
ACrIONS THAT ARE CURRENILY PENIINGAGAI ST US (R OURPRIEGSORSINWHIQI
YOU NICHTBEA POIENrIALCLASSMENEEK (We reain our rights toconplaintoanyregdauiy
agmcyor womnssior) YOU ANDWE EAIAGREETHAT, TO TFULLEST EXTENTP(ISIBLE
PROVIDI]) BY LAW:
(1) ANY CONTROVERSY ORCLAIM ARISING .JrOFORRELAT[NJ 10 THIS ACEFEMENT, ORTO
ANY PRIORACREEMENT FORCEI ULAR SERVICE MTH LS... WILL BE S ErILE) BY
NI])FI\DENT ARBIFRATION INVOLVIM A IEUrRAL ARBIRATOR AND ADMNISTEREDBY
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATICN ASSCX-ATICN ("AAA') UNDIR WIRELESS INIUSRY
ARHFTRATION ('WIN) RULES, AS MCUHEDBY 'IHISAaUEMENr. WA RiLES AND FEE
INFORMATION ARE AVAILAIE FROMS OR THE AAA,
(2) EVEN IF APIICABLELAW PERMTS (LASS ACTIONS ORCLASS ARITRATIONS, YOU
WAIVEANY RIGHE 10 PURSUE ON ACIASS BASES ANY S UH CONROVERSY CR CLAIM
AGAI SE IS... AND WE WAIVE ANY RIGHE TOIURSUE (N A (LASS BARSANY SUM
CCTQR SY R CLAIMAJINST YOU. ...
(3) I' arbitraur has aithotitytoava'd rdiefinexcess ofwht this ageenert provides, cr toord" consol idation
or dass abitration ecept tha anarbitrordedding adahnaringout of cr rdafingtoapricr agement nay
grant as muc substantive relief ona non-class bais as suchpricr ageemimt woukiparit. NO MATIER WHAT
ELSE THIS ACEEMENr SAYS, IT DESNT AIfECTTHE SIBSTANE OR AMOUNT OF ANY
CLAIM YOU MAY ALRFADY HAVE AGAII US ORANYOFOURAFFILIATES ORPREDECESSORS
IN ffNIHES PRDRTOTI-US ACREEvEN. THE AGREEMINTJUSTRB RES YOU TO
ARBTRATE SLC CLAIMS ON AN INDI VIIXAL BASIS n arbitrations, tie arbitrar mns give effect to
applicale staues cf liniaims andwil decile "rhetIrran isste is abitrableor nct. Ina LargeCorrplex Case
arbitration, the arbtraors must aso aly the Fecral Rulesof Eidmce aid (he losing ixrty rmy have the award
revioewdby apIel of3arbiltrar
(4) IFIFOR SOME REASONTHIFARBIRATION REQUIENISDOiN'T APLY, YOU AND
WE EACH WAIVE, TO ThEFULFSTEXIENT ALLOW]M) BY LAW, ANY TRIAL BY JURY. A
JUDGE WILL DECIDEANY DISPUTE IMAD
(5) NOMATIERWHATEIL HS AGREE1Nrl" SAYS, ITDOESN'TAPIIY TO(RAFFECT THE
RIGHIS IN ACERrIHEDCLASS ACIION (FA NMBEROFA (ERTIFIED CLASS WI)FIRST
RECrIVES TIISAGMEMENEAFIER HIS CLASSHAS BEEN CERrIHEF, ORTHERIGHIS IN
ANACTIONOFA NAMH) PLAINT[FF, ALT-UGHITDOES AFPLYTOOTHIER ACT[C'S,
C(NIROVERSEES, OR QA1MSINVOLVING SUCH PERSCNS.
Figures 26 and 27. Example of Cellular Phone Contract, 2002
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"Bargaining in the shadow of the law" is a phrase often invoked, but
bargaining is increasingly a requirement of the law of conflict resolu-
tion.66 As a consequence, the distinctive character of adjudication as a
specific kind of "social ordering" that could be contrasted with others-
such as contracts and elections (to borrow Lon Fuller's terminology and
categories 67)-is diminishing. Through case management, judicial efforts
at settlement, mandatory ADR, enforcement of ex ante waivers of rights to
trial and devolution to closed agency processes, the framework of "due
process procedure" is replaced by what I think is fairly called "contract
procedure." 6 8
VI. THE DEMOCRACY IN ADJUDICATION
A return is now in order to the questions I put forth at the outset-
perhaps best summarized as "so what?" Many people would concur with
the description that I have proffered about the changing contours of adju-
dication but come to the conclusion that the shifts are to be celebrated.
Proponents of this view focus on how adjudication can be cumbersome
and expensive, and its public dimensions burdensome and painfully inva-
sive of privacy. They argue that reconfiguration is appropriate not only in
response to demands imposed by the volume of cases, but also because
other methods are better suited to solve the problems. Moreover, in a
world overloaded with information and many displays of "reality" through
disclosure of personal data, no need exists for more. Websites, blogs, and
newspapers do more than enough to populate the public sphere with nar-
ratives and conflicting claims. One could thus use a combination of new
technologies and the demand curve spurred by democratic precepts for
adjudication as justifications for its devolution and privatization.
A recent essay by a thoughtful federal trial judge who has played a
leadership role in the federal judiciary explains some of this point of view.
As I have done, he too put the question in visual terms through asking
about how "reality television" should portray a federal trialjudge. In civil
cases, he answered:
In an office setting without the robe, using a computer and court
administrative staff to monitor the entire caseload and individual
case progress; conferring with lawyers (often by telephone or
videoconference) in individual cases to set dates or limits; in that
same office at a computer, pouring over a particular lawsuit's
66. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
67. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353,
363 (1978) (posthumously published essay based on materials written initially in
late 1950s).
68. For further discussion, see Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Trans-
forming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924 (2000).
[Vol. 53: p. 771
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facts, submitted electronically as affidavits, documents, deposi-
tions, and interrogatory answers; structuring and organizing
those facts, rejecting some or many of them; finally, researching
the law (at the computer, not a library) and writing (at the com-
puter) explanations of the law for parties and lawyers in light of
the sorted facts. For federal civil cases, the black-robed figure up
on the bench, presiding publicly over trials and instructing juries,
has become an endangered species, replaced by a person in busi-
ness attire at an office desk surrounded by electronic assistants. 69
He further argued that, although judges' "mission to interpret and clarify
laws, adjudicate and protect rights, maintain fair processes, and punish,"
has remained the same, "the method of carrying out that mission has
changed." He said:
Law professors and judges should stop bemoaning disappearing
trials. Trials have gone the way of landline telephones-useful
backups, not the instruments primarily relied upon, if ever they
were. Dramatists enjoy trials. District judges enjoy trials. Some
lawyers enjoy trials. Except as bystanders, ordinary people and
businesses don't enjoy trials, because of the unacceptable risk
and expense.7 0
His position brings me to the third aspect of this Lecture, which is to
sketch the contours of a normative theory from democratic practices
about what is lost-and hence to be "bemoaned"-by the decline in pub-
lic processes for dispute resolution. Jeremy Bentham made claims that
public processes are useful in generating more accurate outcomes, and he
also posited that publicity helped to produce legitimacy. I take a some-
what different tack, in that my argument is not focused on the relationship
between openness and truth but instead on how public processes of courts
contribute to the functioning of democracies and give meaning to demo-
cratic precepts that locate sovereignty in the people, constrain govern-
ment actors, and insist on the equality of treatment under law.
Consider first the interaction between observers and courts. Public
processes and published opinions permit individuals who are neither em-
69. D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the US District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D
453, 462 (2007).
70. Id. at 468. Judge Hornby continued:
In the twenty-first century, the federal district courts' primary roles in civil
cases have become law exposition, fact sorting, and case management-
office tasks-not umpiring trials. In criminal cases, the judges' work re-
mains courtroom-centered but, instead of trials, it has become law elabo-
ration and fact finding at sentencing, supervising federal offenders after
prison, and safeguarding the integrity of a criminal process that sends
defendants to prison without trial. In 2007, that is the federal district
courts' business. Trials as we know them, and unfettered sentencing dis-
cretion, are not coming back.
Id. at 468.
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ployees of the courts nor disputants to learn, first-hand, about processes
and outcomes. Indeed, courts-and the discussions that their processes
produce-are one avenue through which private persons come together
to form a "public,"7 ' an identity as participants acting within a political
and social order. Courts make this contribution by being what could be
called "non-denominational" or non-partisan, in that they are one of rela-
tively few communal spaces open to participants whatever their other po-
litical, religious, or social affiliations. Open court proceedings enable
people to watch, debate, develop, contest, and materialize the exercise of
both public and private power.
Moreover, courts provide a unique service in that they create distinc-
tive opportunities to gain knowledge. Extraordinary conflicts have many
routes into the public sphere. The media (including bloggers) or mem-
bers of government may initiate investigations. Courts may help uncover
relevant information in these arenas (as we have seen in the litigation re-
lated to individuals detained after 9/11), but courts distinguish themselves
from either the media or other government-based investigatory mecha-
nisms in an important respect-the attention paid to ordinary disputes.
Courts do not rely on national traumas or scandals or on ad hoc enabling
acts, nor on selling copies of their decisions. Further, courts do not re-
spond only when something "interesting" is at issue.
What is the utility of having a window into the mundane? That is
where people live and that is where state control can be both useful and
yet overreaching. The dense and tedious repetition of ordinary exchanges
is where one finds the enormity of the power of both bureaucratic states
and private sector actors, and that authority is at risk of operating unseen.
By observing the redundancy of various claims of right and the
processes, allegations, and behaviors that become the predicates to judg-
ments, debate can occur not only about the particulars of a given proce-
dure and its outcome but also about what the underlying norms ought to
be. So called "domestic violence" provides one ready example of the role
of public processes in reorienting an understanding of so-called private
life.
The results of public knowledge gathered from open dispute resolu-
tion ought not, however, be presumed to be generative in any one direc-
tion. Public awareness can give new rights or new limits (fueling, for an
example, caps on tort remedies because of visions of juries run amok).
Moreover, because even a few cases can make a certain problem vivid, so-
cial policies may be forged that respond in extravagant ways to harms that
are less pervasive than perceived. Criminal sanctions are exemplary here,
as public disclosures of particular crimes produce anger and vengeful
consequences.
71. See generally Craig Calhoun, Introduction in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE, supra note 31, at 1.
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Publicity itself has come back into vogue as a form of punishment.
Press coverage of individuals found to have sexually assaulted children
prompted new laws that require individuals who are convicted of a wide
array of offenses to register with government officials and to have their
photos placed on the web so that, upon completion of prison sentences,
potential neighbors could be forewarned about their presence. 72 In short,
public display does not necessarily trigger reasoned discourses. But what
the publicity does enable is the ability of Foucault's "unruly crowd" to re-
spond in ways uncontrollable by those protective of their own powers and
prerogatives. 7 3 Discipline and control of those powers may (not will, but
may) follow.
Openness also changes the power relationships between the partici-
pants and their audience by undermining the ability of the government or
the disputants to control the social meaning of conflicts and their resolu-
tions. An example comes from the broadcast of the video of the death of
Saddam Hussein. Recall that, on December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein
was hanged-five days after he had lost an appeal of his sentence.74
At first, the media reported that "14 Iraqi officials attended the hang-
ing" at an unspecified location and that "witnesses said Mr. Hussein was
carrying a Koran and was compliant as the noose was draped around his
neck." 75 But within a day, a "new video ... appeared on the Internet...
apparently made by a witness with a camera cellphone"; that tape showed
the "unruly, mocking atmosphere in the execution chamber" and re-
corded the taunts hurled at Hussein at his death. 76 Although the organ-
ized media in different countries debated whether to air that video, the
media did not control the channels of distribution, and the disclosures
resulted in a torrent of reaction to and comment about the timing, fact
and process of the execution. 77
The uncontrollability of the distribution of that video has its counter-
part in thousands of ordinary actions that take place in low level tribunals.
Once events are accessible to an audience of third parties who are not
72. See, e.g., Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (upholding
constitutionality of state laws requiring such registration and publication).
73. As Foucault detailed, government literally lost control in that, at times,
the public processes of executions were sites in which crowds turned into mobs
that were animated by protests about either the verdicts or the punishments. See
FOUCAULT, supra note 33, at 59.
74. During the course of the trial, three defense lawyers were killed and two
judges were dismissed. SeeJohn F. Burns, James Glanz, Sabrina Travemise & Marc
Santora, In Days Before Hanging, A Push for Revenge and a Push Back from the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at A12.
75. Marc Santora, James Glanz & Sabrina Travernise, Saddam Hussein Hanged
in Baghdad; Swift End to Drama; Troops on Alert, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at Al.
76. John F. Burns & Marc Santora, U.S. Questioned Iraq on the Rush to Hang
Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at Al.
77. Bill Carter, Graphic Video of Execution Presents Hard Choices for U.S. Media,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A7 (noting that Fox News and CNN both ran video, and
that Fox had followed Al Jazeera in doing so).
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themselves disputants, "spectators and auditors" (to borrow Bentham's cat-
egories78 ) can put their descriptions and commentary into the public
realm. These exchanges are rich, albeit sometimes pain-filled, sources of
communicative possibilities. They empower diverse speakers, some of
whom may respond by seeking vengeance and others by offering reasoned
discourses, but all of whom understand themselves as having authority to
speak as a consequence of what they have witnessed or read. In contrast,
without direct access, non-parties must rely on insiders to reveal events,
inevitably translated through their perspectives. Thus, public procedures
themselves teach that conflicts do not belong exclusively to the disputants
or to the government and give the public a place through which to inter-
pret, own, or disown what has occurred.
That courts can-as an empirical matter-affect and sometimes gen-
erate public agendas addressing the intersections of private interests and
public rights provides one justification for open processes that welcome an
audience. In this respect, courts are one part of what many theorists call
the "public sphere," and which Nancy Fraser points out ought to be under-
stood in the plural as public spheres, rather than modeled as a unified
body.79 Courts therefore contribute to the political discourses outside of
their own buildings and often times beyond the parameters of particular
legal or factual disputes.
But that contribution may not be sufficient to support a commitment
to courts in the future. We live in the world of blogs, the internet, the
organized press, and reality TV, as well as the broadcasts of legislative hear-
ings. Places other than courts therefore offer venues that can spark de-
bate, although, as I noted, courts are special contributors by attending to a
volume of mundane matters. An additional and distinct facet of what
makes courts especially useful in democracies can be seen by shifting at-
tention from what potential spectators can see and hear to what litigants,
judges, witnesses, or jurors do as participants in public dispute resolution
processes.
This aspect of my argument for protection of transparent adjudica-
tion hinges on the view that adjudication is itself a democratic practice-
an odd moment in which individuals can oblige others to treat them as
equals as they argue-in public-about alleged misbehavior and wrongdo-
ing. Litigation forces dialogue upon the unwilling (including the govern-
ment), and momentarily alters configurations of authority. The social
practices, the etiquette and a myriad of legal rules shape what those who
enter courts are empowered to do.80
78. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 356.
79. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 31, at
109.
80. This understanding of law as a social practice can be seen in the work of
Robert M. Cover. See Robert M. Cover, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
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When cases proceed in public, courts institutionalize democracy's
claim to impose constraints on state power. In open courts, those govern-
ment employees we call judges have to account for their own authority by
letting others know how and why power is used. Bentham's widely-quoted
phrase captures this activity: "Publicity is the very soul of justice .... It
keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial."81 Such visibility-po-
tentially a constraining power-is not available when judges sit in their
offices and operate by discussions with parties on telephones or through
computers. Moreover, when government officials are parties to litigation,
they are subjected to scrutiny and forced either as plaintiffs or defendants
to comply with court rules. Government litigants must bear the exposure
that obligations of discovery impose, thereby exposing their past deeds,
their files and their emails.
Courts can be great levelers in another respect, in that participatory
parity is an express goal of courts, even if not always achieved. 82 Litigants
are supposed to interact with each other as equals, with rights to make
demands on each other and to be treated as equals by judges, juries, law-
yers, and staff. When courts fail to do so-in public-they serve as a place
in which to expose the absence of equal treatment.
For example, during the 1970s and 1980s, as women and men of
color brought claims of discrimination to courts in the United States, they
found that some judges responded that differential treatment was natural.
Some litigants found themselves subjected by opposing lawyers or by
judges to discriminatory treatment and stereotyping. In response to such
concerns, the chiefjustices of many state courts convened special projects,
denominated "fairness" or "gender bias" and "racial bias" task forces.
These projects identified areas of law (such as sentencing decisions and
violence against women) in which doctrines and practices did not accord
equal treatment. 8 3 Statutes, rulemaking, and case law resulted because
materials that were accessible to public scrutiny showed behaviors at odds
with the provision of "equal justice under law." 84
The function of courts as potentially egalitarian political venues can
be seen in the efforts to avoid them. After 9/11, the Executive branch of
the United States repeatedly sought to enact legislation "stripping" courts
of jurisdiction over claims that the government had wrongly detained and
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic
Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17 (2005).
81. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 355; see also NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVL PRO-
CEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 79 (2003).
82. Fraser, supra note 79 (arguing that such parity is requisite to proper func-
tioning of Habermasian public spheres).
83. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Asking Questions about Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'y 952 (1996).
84. These are the words inscribed on the front of the facade of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
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tortured individuals. 85 The effort to create a separate "tribunal system"
for alleged enemy combatants is aimed at controlling access and informa-
tion as well as limiting the rights of detainees by augmenting the powers of
the state.
The behavior within courts and the rights that exist inside courts are
central to my argument that courts serve themselves as a site of democratic
valorization of individual dignity, thereby rendering instruction on the val-
ues of a polity or insight into its inability to materialize those commit-
ments. Moreover, in addition to undermining the state's monopoly on
power, forging community ownership of norms, demonstrating inter-liti-
gant obligations, and equalizing the field of exchange, open courts can
express another of democracy's promises-that rules can change because
of popular input. The public and the immediate participants see that law
varies by contexts, decision-makers, litigants, and facts, and they gain a
chance to argue that the governing rules or their applications are wrong.
Through democratic iterations, norms are reconfigured.
To appreciate the political and social utilities of the public dimen-
sions of adjudication is not, however, to ignore the costs and burdens im-
posed. (Bentham listed many.8 6 ) The immediate participants in a dispute
may find the exposure to the public disquieting. Even the disclosure of
accurate information can be uncomfortable. Further, the public dimen-
sions of adjudication may inhibit parties' abilities to find common ground,
thereby deepening discord. And, despite Bentham's confidence that pub-
lic disclosure reveals falsehoods, many a court record is subsequently im-
peached as predicated on witnesses who lied.
Further, one should not romanticize spectatorship. Locating judg-
ment in courthouses with windows to the streets and open doors makes
publicity possible, but even then a question remains about how to secure
an audience and have its members be engaged.8 7 Watching state-author-
ized processes may prompt celebration, action, or dialectic exchanges that
develop new norms, but boredom can also result. Were every door to
every one of the tens of thousands of administrative hearings to be open,
one would not expect many (any?) to volunteer to see many of the pro-
85. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(to be codified at scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
86. While providing many explanations of the utility of public processes, Ben-
tham also argued the costs of public disclosure as he analyzed justifications for
privacy (such as protecting participants from "annoyance," avoiding unnecessary
harm to individuals through "disclosure of facts prejudicial to their honour" or
about their "pecuniary circumstances," and preserving "public decency" and state
secrets). His view was that a presumption in favor of public trials should, upon
occasion, give way. See BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 360.
87. Bentham considered whether to have public authorities require attend-
ance as a matter of duty or to provide compensation for attendance or to devise
some other "factitious means." He also advocated that permission liberally be
granted for the publication of information obtained-and for its republication.
Id.
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ceedings. But it is the happenstance of observation that is the font of what
makes open courts an important facet of a functioning democracy.
VII. NEITHER RITES NOR RIGHTS
This mapping of the declining public dimensions of conflict resolu-
tion is aimed at undermining the assumption that public access to and
transparent proceedings within courts is an enduring feature of courts.
Procedures, laws, and norms have great plasticity. Practices that seemed
unimaginable only decades ago (from the mundane examples of the rela-
tively new reliance on court-based settlement programs to the stunning
assertions by the U.S. government of the legitimacy of according little or
no procedural rights to individuals at Guant.namo Bay and elsewhere) are
now parts of our collective landscape.
But neither ought one assume that secrecy is an essential characteris-
tic of the alternatives (agencies, ADR, private providers) to courts. As the
variety of rules and customs surrounding court-annexed arbitration sug-
gests, even as judges and other dispute resolution providers move away
from trials and focus on pretrial management and dispute resolution in
chambers and conference rooms, it is possible to build in a place for the
public ("sunshine," to borrow the term that legislators have used) or to
wall off proceedings from the public.
For example, at the UCLA conference on transparency, Professor Ste-
phen Yeazell proposed a database of civil settlements to provide a market
of information about such agreements. He noted that a software pro-
gram-aptly named Colosses-exists that could make that proposal practi-
cal, were there political will and financial support as well as protections for
privacy. 88 His proposal underscores that whatever the places constituted
as authoritative, opportunities exist to engender or to preclude communal
exchanges.89
As Jeremy Bentham explained, it was possible for "publicity" to occur
through "natural" instruments-"without any act done by any person (at
least by any person in authority) with the intention and for the purpose of
producing or contributing to the production of this effect."90 Alterna-
tively, the ability to have decision-making in public came from what Ben-
tham termed "factitious" opportunities, which were those "brought into
existence or put in action by the hand of power."9 ' The creation of build-
ings--of courtrooms as sites of adjudication-with doors thus required that
one had to decide whether to make them public or not. As Bentham said,
88. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Law-
suits?, RAND & UCLA Sch. of Law Conference, Transparency in the Civil Justice
System (Nov. 2, 2007) (on file with author).
89. BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 354.
90. Id.
91. Id.
39
Resnik: Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite - The Norman Shachoy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2008
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Considered in itself, a room allotted to the reception of the evi-
dence in question ... is an instrument rather of privacy than of
publicity; since, if performed in the open air... the number of
persons capable of taking cognizance of it would bear no fixed
limits .... 92
Bentham's imagery and terminology helps us all to see that the ques-
tion of public or private proceedings entails political choices. To create a
public space as an active site requires normative commitments, predicated
on a political theory about the role that the audience plays in juridical
proceedings. This excursion into a m6lange of cultural history, custom,
practice, data, and rules is aimed at provoking efforts to generate such
theories. I hope to have undermined some of the presumed stability that
could come from a first reading of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, from Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, or from viewing the thousands of impressive courthouses
in countries around the world.
Having mapped some of democracy's debts to adjudication and in
turn, the challenges that democracy has now posed for adjudication, one
can see that the question of "transparency" is not only in play when cases
are seen as raising problems for "national security." The display of justice
is on the wane in some of the venues in which it was once vibrant, and its
relocation to other locations has not been accompanied by either rites or
rights of audience. As the processes of judgment become increasingly
rare, they return to the realm of the spectacle, the audience becomes
voyeuristic rather than democratic and power flows back to the producers.
92. Id.
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